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Complementary Online Services in Competitive Markets: 
How Firms Should Adjust Their Strategies Due to Network Effects 
 
Pang Min-Seok and Hila Etzion 
Ross School of Business , University of Michigan 
 
Abstract 
A growing number of firms are strategically utilizing IT and the Internet to provide 
online services to consumers who buy their products. Online services differ from 
traditional services, such as maintenance services, because they often promote 
interactivity among the firm’s customers and exhibit positive network effects. In this 
paper, we model the competition between two firms that sell a differentiated product, 
when each firm can offer a complementary online service to its customers. We examine 
how the market equilibrium changes when the service exhibits network effects, and 
determine how firms should adjust their strategies to account for such effects. 
Specifically, we find that when the service exhibits network effects, a firm’s decision 
whether to offer the service depends on the competitor’s decision as well as on the 
competitor’s service quality. When the service does not exhibit network effects, this is not 
the case. In addition, if the service exhibits network effects the two firms may be caught in 
a Prisoner’s Dilemma; a situation that does not arise in the absence of network effect. 
We also show that technological progress that enhances the value of the network to 
consumers can reduce firms’ profits when both offer the service. An increase in the size 
of the market can also have a negative effect on profits when the service exhibits network 
effects, but not otherwise. Finally, unlike previous works on products with network 
effects, showing under-provision in the context of a monopoly, we show that both under- 
and over-provision of services can arise in a competitive setting. 
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Complementary Online Services in Competitive Markets: 
How Firms Should Adjust Their Strategies Due to Network Effects 
 
1.  Introduction 
In various industries, ranging from traditional manufacturing to high-tech, the locus of 
competition has shifted from selling products to providing value-adding services. As many 
products are commoditized, firms have been focusing on developing complementary smart 
services that offer greater value to customers who buy their products. Such services can increase 
the firm’s revenues and allow it to achieve a competitive advantage (Allmendinger and 
Lombreglia 2005, Reinartz and Ulaga 2008).  
Recent advances in information and communication technologies, such as Web 2.0 and 
“Social Technologies” (Li and Bernoff 2008), enable firms to provide new types of value-adding 
services (such as blogs, peer-to-peer file sharing, social networking sites, and online gaming 
platforms), to their customers. These online services differ from traditional services (e.g., 
maintenance, repair, and training services) because most of them promote relationship building 
and interactivity among the users, and thus exhibit positive network effects. That is, the value of 
the service to a user increases with the number of other consumers that subscribe to the service.   
One notable type of an online services that can add value to consumers that buy a firm’s 
product, and exhibits positive network effects, is online communities. Dell operates Dell 
Community (www.dell.com/community), which offers valuable complementary services to Dell’s 
PC users. In this online community, Dell customers can share information and knowledge that 
they have acquired while using Dell products. Oracle and IBM also operate online communities 
for users of their products (e.g., www.ibm.com/developerworks/). Microsoft operates an online 
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community, Zune Social (http://cocial.zune.net/), where it’s Zune MP3 player users can share 
music they purchase.  
Another type of online services that exhibit network effects are online gaming platforms 
which enable consumers who purchase a packaged computer game to play it online with remote 
human players. For example, a consumer who buys Starcraft or World of Warcraft from Blizzard  
(a leader in the computer games industry), can play the game offline in the single-player mode. 
Playing offline, the consumer plays pre-defined scenarios against hypothetical competitors with 
artificial intelligence. However, if the consumer connects to Blizzard’s online gaming platform, 
Battle.net, he can also play the game in the multi-player mode, playing in real-time against other 
remote human players. The set of pre-programmed game strategies included in the game package 
is narrower than the set of strategies that can be used by human players. Therefore, many 
Blizzard customers are willing to pay a premium when buying the game package, knowing they 
can also access the online service. While some online games can be accessed and used without 
owning a game package, other games, such as Starcraft and World of Warcraft, do need client 
software (the product) installed on the user’s computer. Such games have sophisticated and 
complex graphics and features, and thus a simple Web browser is not enough to access them; 
Players need proprietary “fat client programs” installed on their computers. 
In this paper, we consider an industry in which competing firms sell a differentiated 
product and each firm can choose to offer a complementary online service to consumers that buy 
its product. We examine how the fact that the online service exhibits positive network effects 
may change the competitive outcome, and whether sellers and society always benefit from 
stronger positive network effects. To do so, we compare the competitive outcome when the 
service does not exhibit network effects (e.g., a maintenance service, a periodic newsletter, etc.) 
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with the competitive outcome when the service does exhibit positive network effects (e.g., an 
online forum, an online game platform, etc.). Specifically, we address the following research 
questions: 1) Under what conditions should each firm offer the complementary service to its 
customers? 2) Should firms adjust their strategies when the service exhibits network effects? 3)  
Do firms and society benefit from an increase in the degree of network effects? 
Our investigation generates several interesting results. First, we find that when the service 
exhibits network effects, a firm’s decision whether to offer the service may depend on the 
competitor’s decision, as well as on the competitor’s service quality. In contrast, when the 
service does not exhibit network effects, each firm bases the decision whether to offer the service 
only on its own service quality. In addition, we show that when the service exhibits network 
effects, in some cases two equilibriums may prevail. In these cases, there is a first mover 
advantage in the sense that each firm would offer the service if the competitor does not offer it, 
but would choose not to offer the service when the competitor does offer it. This situation does 
not happen when the service does not exhibit network effect. 
We show that if both firms offer the service in equilibrium, and the firms’ service qualities 
are similar, then the two firms are caught in a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Specifically, both firms offer 
the service, but they would be better off when neither offers the service. Thus, advances in 
communication technologies, which enable the firms to offer online services with positive 
network effects, can reduce the industry’s overall profitability, while benefiting consumers. We 
show that this does not happen in the absence of network effects. We also identify the existence 
of a Bertrand supertrap (Cabral and Villas-Boas, 2005), in which a common exogenous change 
that seems favorable to sellers (such as an increase in the degree of network effects or in the size 
of the market) may in fact lower the sellers’ profits because it intensifies price competition.  
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Lastly, we show that while the literature on network effects often argues that a network 
good is underprovided by a monopoly, in the duopoly setting both under- and over-provision of 
the service may prevail. Specifically, whether the service exhibits network effects or not, price 
competition may lead the firms to excessively offer the service compared to the social optimum.  
The paper structure is as follows. In Section 2, we review the related literature on products 
with network effects. In Section 3, we present our model. In Section 4, we derive the market 
equilibrium, examine how the firms’ strategies change when the service exhibits network effects, 
and discuss social welfare implications. In Section 5, we examine how network effects and the 
size of the market influence the firms’ profitability. In Sections 6 and 7, we discuss two possible 
extensions, and we conclude in Section 8.  
2. Literature Review 
Our study is related mainly to the literature on network effects. Network effects arise when the 
utility that a user derives from a product increases with the number of other consumers that use 
the same or compatible product (Katz and Shapiro, 1985). Therefore, a customer's utility from a 
product that displays network effects is usually modeled as a function of the product's inherent 
value and of the number of customers using the product (Ellison and Fudenberg, 2000). In 
addition, most models consider the network effects to be linear in the size of the user-base (Katz 
and Shapiro 1986, Fudenberg and Tirole 2000, Jing 2007). In this paper, we adopt a similar 
modeling approach and model the value a consumer obtains from the service as an additive 
function of the value derived from the inherent functionalists of the service and the value derived 
from the network of service users.  
In the classic models of products with network effects, the value a consumer derives from 
the network is independent of the consumer type. Specifically, consumers have homogenous 
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network valuations though they may have heterogeneous product valuations (Cabral et al. 1999, 
Fudenberg and Tirole 2000, Jing 2007). In some recent models, however, a multiplicative 
function is used in which the consumer type determines both his product valuation and the 
benefit he obtains from the network (e.g., Ellison and Fudenberg 2000, Sundararajan 2003, 
Sundararajan 2004). In such models, a consumer with high (low) product valuation also has a 
high (low) marginal valuation for the network of product users.  In the base model presented in 
this paper, we assume consumers have homogenous service valuations. However, we discuss the 
implications of heterogeneous service valuations in Section 7. 
A large number of studies on network goods examine product compatibility and 
standardization (e.g., Farrell and Saloner 1986, Katz and Shapiro 1985), technology adoption 
(e.g., Choi 1994, Katz and Shapiro 1986) and entry deterrence (Cabral et al. 1999, Fudenberg 
and Tirole 2000). The present paper contributes to the literature on network effects as it 
examines a duopoly in which firms can offer a service that exhibits network effects to consumers 
that buy their product. The current paper focuses on how the presence of network effects changes 
the resulting market equilibrium and the profitability of the firms.    
The concept of Fulfilled Expectation Equilibrium is often used in deriving the firm’s optimal 
pricing strategy when the product exhibits network effects. In the presence of network effects, 
consumers purchasing decision is based on the expected network size, and under the Fulfilled 
Expectation Equilibrium requirement the realized demand indeed equals to the expected network 
size (Katz and Shapiro 1985, Palma et al. 1999, Sundararajan 2004).  
Under-provision of a product with network effects has been shown in the literature.  For 
example, Katz and Shapiro (1994) state that in the presence of network externalities, social 
marginal benefits from an increase of one unit in network size exceed private (i.e., the firm’s) 
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marginal benefits, and thus the equilibrium network size is smaller than the socially optimal 
network size. Sundararajan (2004) derives the monopolist’s optimal nonlinear pricing strategy 
when consumers have heterogeneous network valuations and may purchase variable quantities of 
the good. He shows that the product might be under-supplied relative to the socially optimal 
level. In this paper, we show that in a competitive setting, a service with network effects might 
be over-provided by firms. 
Finally, our work is also related to Matutes and Regibeau (1988, 1992), who consider a 
duopoly in which each firm sells two components, and a consumer has to purchase both 
components to form a system; either component in isolation does not provide value. In Matutes 
and Regibeau (1988), a seller may choose to make its components compatible with the 
competitor’s, so that a consumer is able to purchase the two components from different sellers. 
They analyze this compatibility decision and find that making the components compatible with 
the competitor’s may increase the equilibrium price and profit. Matutes and Regibeau (1992) 
analyze a mixed-bundling strategy and find that the two vendors may end up in a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma situation. Specifically, even though a pure-component strategy generates greater profit, 
the firms may choose the mixed-bundling strategy in equilibrium. They also find that the bundles 
may be provided more than the social optimum. Our paper differs in three major ways. First, in 
our paper, the two components, namely product and service, are not symmetric. That is, the 
product can be valuable in the absence of the service, but not the opposite. For that reason, a firm 
might choose to sell only the product. Second, we consider the case in which the online service is 
valuable only when buying the product from the firm that provides the service. Third, and most 
importantly, the aforementioned models do not consider network effects, while our paper focuses 
on how network effects change the market equilibrium and the firms’ profitability. 
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3. The Model 
We consider a market with two competing firms, Firm A and Firm B, selling a differentiated 
durable product. There are M consumers in the market who are heterogeneous in terms of their 
product preferences, and each consumer is interested in purchasing at most one unit of the 
product. We assume that consumers’ product preferences are uniformly distributed along a unit 
line (Hotelling 1929), with Firm A’s product located at 0 and Firm B’s product located at 1. 
When a consumer buys a product that differs from his ideal product, he incurs a misfit cost 
which is increasing in the distance between his ideal product and the product he buys. Thus, a 
consumer located at point x on the unit line obtains utility of 𝑉 − 𝑡𝑥 when purchasing the 
product from Firm A, and utility of 𝑉 − 𝑡(1 − 𝑥) when purchasing the product from Firm B, 
where V is the maximum utility from the product sold by either firm, and t is the per-unit 
disutility cost from the misfit between the consumer’s ideal product and the product he considers 
to purchase. Without loss of generality, we also assume that the product’s unit production cost is 
the same for both firms, and it is normalized to 0 (in case there is a positive product production 
cost, the model can still apply if consumers valuations of the product are taken net of the 
marginal cost).  
Each of the two firms has the ability to offer a complementary online service to its 
customers, and needs to choose if to do so. The inherent value of the service (that is, the value 
that does not depend on how many consumers are using the service) offered by Firm i is si, and 
the two firms may differ in the quality of the service that they offer (i.e., sA may be higher or 
lower than sB). Thus, the services can be vertically differentiated due to the difference in their 
quality, but, as seen later, also due to the difference in the number of service users. The 
parameter  represents the increase in the consumer’s utility caused by a marginal improvement 
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in the intrinsic functionalities of the service. Here, we assume that sA and sB are given and are 
common knowledge, and model the firms’ decisions whether to offer the service assuming any 
development costs are sunk. Later, in Section 6, we discuss the case in which developing the 
service is costly and each firm determines the quality of the inherent functionalities of its service. 
If the service exhibits positive network effects then, in addition to the inherent value 
described above, a consumer obtains utility of αNi when using the service offered by Firm i. 
Here, Ni is the number of consumers using the service offered by Firm i, and α is the marginal 
network benefit obtained when an additional consumer uses the service. Thus, the parameter α 
represents the strength of the network effects. Specifically, when α = 0 the service does not 
exhibit network effects, and as α increases the service exhibits stronger network effects. As in 
many papers on products with network effects (e.g., Katz and Shapiro 1985), we assume 
consumers have homogenous marginal valuation for the network. That is, all consumers have the 
same α.  
We consider the case in which a consumer obtains positive utility from using the service 
offered by Firm i only when he purchases the product sold by Firm i. That is, the service offered 
by Firm i is not beneficial to consumers who buy a product from Firm j or to those who do not 
buy a product at all. Though we acknowledge that this assumption might not hold for all types of 
product-related online services, our paper focuses on services for which it does. Future research 
can consider services that can be valuable to consumers who do not buy the firm’s product. To 
summarize, the added utility a Firm i’s customer (i.e., a consumer who purchase the product sold 
by Firm i) obtains from using the service offered by Firm i is given by:  
𝛾𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼𝑁𝑖      (1) 
The focus of our paper is to examine how the fact that many types of online services 
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exhibit positive network effects changes the competitive outcome, and whether sellers benefit 
from stronger network effects. We thus compare the competitive outcome when firms offer a  
service that does not exhibit network effects (e.g., a maintenance service, a periodic newsletter 
etc.) with the competitive outcome when the service considered does exhibit positive network 
effects (e.g., an online forum, an online game platform, etc.). 
Finally, as the number of service users increases, the firm needs to invest in upgrading its 
hardware and network infrastructure. Thus the cost of offering the service increases with the 
number of service users. We assume that the marginal cost of offering the service, c, is the same 
for both firms. This assumption is reasonable due to the fact that hardware, bandwidth, 
processors, communication technology etc. are commodities and available for all firms for the 
same cost. Table 1 summarizes the notation used in the paper.  
M The number of consumers  
V The inherent value of the product 
t Misfit cost per unit distance between product purchased and one desired  
γ Marginal valuation of intrinsic functionalities of the service 
α The degree of network effects 
si The intrinsic value of the service of Firm i (i = A or B) 
c The marginal cost for providing the service 
𝑝𝐾
𝑖  
The price of the product sold by Firm i when the firms choices regarding 
service provision are given by k , where k{NN,SN, NS,SS}  
𝐷𝑘
𝑖  
The demand for Firm i product when choices regarding service provision  
are given by k. 
𝜋𝑘
𝑖  The profit of Firm i when choices regarding service provision are k. 
Table 1. Notation 
The timeline of the game is as follows. First, the firms, which know their service qualities 
(sA and sB), simultaneously choose whether to offer the service to their customers or not. Four 
market configurations are possible as a result of this first stage of the game. In the first 
configuration, labeled Case NN, both firms sell only the product. In the second configuration, 
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Case SN, and the third, Case NS, only Firm A or only Firm B, respectively, offer the service 
while the other firm sells only the product. Finally, in the fourth configuration, Case SS, both 
firms offer the service to consumers who buy their product.   
Next, after observing the choices made in the first stage of the game (firms make their 
service offerings public), the two firms simultaneously set their prices. Notice that due to the fact 
that in our model all consumers have the same valuation for the service offered by Firm i, given 
by si+ αNi, if Firm i were to sell the product for a price pi and the service for a fee fi
 
, then in 
equilibrium either all the consumers that buy its product would also buy its service (this happens 
if the firm sets fi such that si+ αNi. ≥ fi), or none of them would (when si+ αNi. <fi). Thus, 
selling the product for a price pi and the service for a fee, fi, such that si+ αNi  >fi,  yields the 
same profit as selling a bundle of product and service for a single price of pi+ fi, or, alternatively, 
selling the product for a price pi+fi while offering the service “free of charge” to consumers who 
buy the product. These three strategies lead to the same demand and to the same profit. This 
would not be true if consumers had heterogeneous service valuations (an extension we discuss in 
Section 7). Since the latter strategy (offering the service free of charge to consumers who buy the 
product) is the one most commonly observed in reality (the reader is referred to the examples in 
the Introduction), in our model each firm sets its product price and offers the service free of 
charge to consumers who buy its product. Clearly, the price of the product depends on whether 
the service is offered.  Finally, in the third stage of the game, consumers observe the prices set by 
the firms and the service offerings, and choose whether to buy a product and from which firm. 
Figure 1 describes the timeline of the game. 
The consumer’s surplus functions and the firms’ profits, as function of prices, for the four 
possible outcomes of the first stage of the game are given in Table 2.  




Figure 1. The timeline of the game  
 




Customer’s Surplus  
From Firm A 
Customer’s Surplus  
From Firm  B 
Firm’s Profit 
Case  NN.  
Both sell only the 
product 
𝑢𝑁𝑁
𝐴 = 𝑉 − 𝑡𝑥 − 𝑝𝑁𝑁
𝐴  𝑢𝑁𝑁




𝑖   
Case SS.   
Both offer the 
service 
𝑢𝑆𝑆
𝐴 = 𝑉 − 𝑡𝑥 + 𝛾𝑠𝐴 
           +𝛼𝐷𝑆𝑆
𝐴 − 𝑝𝑆𝑆
𝐴   
𝑢𝑆𝑆
𝐵 = 𝑉 − 𝑡 1 − 𝑥 + 𝛾𝑠𝐵 
           +𝛼𝐷𝑆𝑆
𝐵 − 𝑝𝑆𝑆




𝑖 − 𝑐)  
 
Case SN.  
Only Firm A 
offers a service 
𝑢𝑆𝑁
𝐴 = 𝑉 − 𝑡𝑥 + 𝛾𝑠𝐴  
           +𝛼𝐷𝑆𝑁
𝐴 − 𝑝𝑆𝑁
𝐴   
𝑢𝑠𝑁









Table 2. The customer’s surplus and the firms’ profits as functions of prices and demands. Here, 
𝑢𝑘
𝑖  refers to the surplus a consumer derives when buying from Firm i under market configuration 
k. The demand, 𝐷𝑘
𝑖  , is always a function of prices. (Case NS is symmetric to Case SN) 
It is important to note that in this paper we chose to consider only parameters values such 
that, for each of the four possible outcomes of the first stage of the game, in equilibrium: i) each 
firm has positive demand for its product, and ii) firms face spatial competition in the product 
market. We believe that such cases are of the highest interest as they represent real competition 
between the two firms. When only one firm has positive demand for the product, the other firm 
is in fact inactive. When the product market is not covered, each firm behaves as a local 
monopoly. The specific conditions on the parameters values for the above two requirements to 
hold are derived in Appendix 1, and are summarized in Assumption 1 in Appendix 2.  
In order to determine which market configuration (NN, SS, NS, or SN) prevails in 
equilibrium, we first find the equilibrium prices and profits for each such possible configuration. 
Specifically, using the consumer surplus functions given in Table 2, we derived the demand and 
the profit as functions of the prices (i.e., the result of the third stage of the game for a given 
Stage 1. The two 
firms simultaneously 
decide whether to 
offer service 
Stage 2. Firms 
observe result of 
first stage and 
simultaneously set 
product prices 
Stage 3. Consumers 
observer prices and decide 
whether to buy and from 
which firm. Decisions are 
based on expected network 
size and on prices.  
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market configuration and a given pair of prices). For the cases in which at least one firm offers a 
service (i.e., Cases SN, NS and SS), we used the concept of Fulfilled Expectation Equilibrium 
(Katz and Shapiro 1985, Sundararajan 2003), in which the number of service users in 
equilibrium equals the expected number of service users which is used by consumers to make a 
purchase decision. After deriving the firms’ profits as functions of prices, we find the Nash 
equilibrium prices for the second stage of the game for each of the four configurations. Tables 3 
and 4 present these equilibrium prices and profits, respectively. The detailed derivations of the 
equilibriums, in the manner described above, are provided in Appendix 1.  
Firm B 
Firm A 
Only Product Product + Service 
Only Product 
𝑝𝑁𝑁
𝐴 = 𝑡 
𝑝𝑁𝑁
𝐵 = 𝑡 
𝑝𝑁𝑆
𝐴 =






























Table 3. The equilibrium prices for the four possible market configurations 
Firm B 
Firm A 
Only Product Product + Service 
Only Product 
𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝐴 = 0.5𝑀𝑡 
𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝐵 = 0.5𝑀𝑡 
𝜋𝑁𝑆
𝐴 =
𝑀 3𝑡 + 𝑐 − 2𝛼𝑀 − 𝛾𝑠𝐵 
2




𝑀 3𝑡 − 𝑐 − 𝛼𝑀 + 𝛾𝑠𝐵 
2






𝑀 3𝑡 − 𝑐 − 𝛼𝑀 + 𝛾𝑠𝐴 
2




𝑀 3𝑡 + 𝑐 − 2𝛼𝑀 − 𝛾𝑠𝐴 
2














Table 4. The equilibrium profits for the four possible market configurations 
In the next section we determine which market configuration prevails in equilibrium. 
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4. The Market Equilibrium 
In this section, we derive the market equilibrium and compare the results when the service  
exhibits network effects and when it does not exhibit network effects, in order to determine 
whether firms should adjust their strategies when offering online services. 
From the payoff matrix given in Table 4, we derive the conditions for the different possible 
pure-strategy Nash equilibriums, as specified in Proposition 1 
Proposition 1. (Market Equilibrium)   
i) Both firms offer the service. Case SS is an equilibrium iff (i.e., if and only if)  
 𝑠𝐴 > 𝑠𝐵𝑋 + 𝑌and 𝑠𝐵 > 𝑠𝐴𝑋 + 𝑌. 
ii) Both firms offer only product. Case NN is an equilibrium iff 𝑠𝐴 < 𝑠 and 𝑠𝐵 < 𝑠 . 
iii) Only firm A offers a service. Case SN is an equilibrium iff 𝑠𝐴 > 𝑠 and 𝑠𝐵 < 𝑠𝐴𝑋 + 𝑌.  
iv) Only firm B offers a service. Case NS is an equilibrium iff 𝑠𝐵 > 𝑠 and 𝑠𝐴 < 𝑠𝐵𝑋 + 𝑌.  
where 𝑋 = 1 −
 2𝑡−2𝛼𝑀
 2𝑡−𝛼𝑀
 , 𝑌 =





, and 𝑠 =
2𝛼𝑀+2𝑐−6𝑡+3 2𝑡(2𝑡−𝛼𝑀)
2𝛾
  . 
Proofs of all propositions are given in Appendix 2. We note that X and 𝑠 are always 
positive when parameters values are such that both firms have positive demand. 
Figure 2 exhibits the resulting market equilibrium in the sA-sB space. The lines d-e-f and g-
e-h in Figure 2, indicate 𝑠𝐴 = 𝑠𝐵𝑋 + 𝑌 and 𝑠𝐵 = 𝑠𝐴𝑋 + 𝑌, respectively. In the region northeast 
of f-e-h, both 𝑠𝐴 > 𝑠𝐵𝑋 + 𝑌 and 𝑠𝐵 > 𝑠𝐴𝑋 + 𝑌 (i.e., Proposition 1-(i) holds). In this region, the 
intrinsic quality of both online services (sA and sB) is sufficiently high that both firms operate the 
service in equilibrium. On the other hand, in the region 0-a-b-c, both sA and sB are less than 𝑠 
(Proposition 1-(ii)), and thus neither Firm A nor Firm B offer the service. Southeast of the lines 
c-b-g-e-h, the conditions from Proposition 1-(iii) hold. In this area, sA is relatively high (i.e., 
higher than 𝑠 ), and sB is either lower than sA or not much higher than it (i.e., 𝑠𝐵 < 𝑠𝐴𝑋 + 𝑌), and 
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therefore there is an equilibrium in which only Firm A offers the service. Similarly, northwest of 
the lines a-b-d-e-f, there is an equilibrium in which only Firm B offers the service.  
 
Figure 2. The market equilibrium in the sA-sB space 
Interestingly, in the region b-d-e-g, two equilibriums are feasible: an equilibrium in which 
only Firm A offers the service and an equilibrium in which only Firm B offers the service. In this 
range of parameter values, each of the firms does not have an incentive to offer the service when 
the competitor offers it; however, each firm finds it optimal to offer the service when it is the 
only one doing so. In other words, when the service exhibits positive network effects, for a 
subset of the parameters values (in the region b-g-e-d) there is a “first mover advantage”, and 
thus two equilibriums are feasible. Notice, that there can be an equilibrium in which a firm with 
a lower quality of service offers the service, while the firm with the higher quality does not. 
Finally, we note that when there are positive network effects, there is always a none-empty range 
of sA-sB values in which two equilibriums are feasible. That is the value of sB at point g (and 
value of sA at point d) , given by 𝑠𝑋 + 𝑌,  is always larger than 𝑠 (this is shown in the end of the 
proof of Proposition 1). 
- 16 - 
Examining Proposition 1, we see that as the degree of network effect, α, increases, X 
always increases. In addition, as long as 14t >16αN (a condition which is often satisfied given 
Assumption 1), 𝑠 increases, and, finally, Y can either increase or decrease. Thus, in many cases, 
as the degree of network effects increases, the range of parameters values for which firms do not 
offer the service increases, and the range of parameters values for which both firms offer the 
service decreases. This result may seem surprising, but as we show later in Section 5, when both 
firms offer the service their profits decrease as the degree of network effects increases. This 
reduction in profit is due to the intensification of price competition. Thus, an increase in the 
degree of network effects may reduce the firms’ incentive to offer the service to begin with. 
 Next, substituting α = 0 (no network effects) in the expressions for X, Y, and 𝑠 from 
Proposition 1, we get: 𝑋 = 0, 𝑌 = 𝑐/ and 𝑠 = 𝑐/𝛾. Corollary 1 describes which equilibrium 
prevails if the service considered does not exhibit network effects.  
Corollary 1. When service does not exhibit network effects, in equilibrium Firm i offers the 
service if 𝒔𝒊 > 𝑐/  and does not offer it otherwise. 
From Corollary 1, we learn that if the service does not exhibit network effects, then a 
firm’s decision whether to offer the service does not depend on whether the competitor is 
offering a service, or on the quality of the competitor’s service. It depends only on whether the 
value a consumer derives from that firm’s service (si) exceeds the marginal service provision 
cost (𝑐). For that reason, when the service does not exhibit network effects, we do not have 
parameters values for which two equilibriums may prevail, and there is no first mover advantage. 
In addition, when the service does not exhibit network effects, whenever 𝑠𝐴 = 𝑠𝐵, either both 
firms offer the service or neither does. However, when the service exhibits network effects, if 
𝑠 < 𝑠𝐴 = 𝑠𝐵 < 𝑌/(1 − 𝑋), in equilibrium only one firm offers the service, even though the firms 
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are symmetric.  
 The rational for the differences in results is as follows. When the service exhibits network 
effects, the value a consumer derives from the service of Firm i depends not only on Firm i’s 
inherent service quality (si) but also on the number of service subscribers. Thus, the utility a 
consumer would obtain from the service of Firm i depends on whether the competing firm, Firm 
j, offers a service or not. Specifically, when the competing firm is offering the service, Firm i’s 
network of service users would be smaller than when the competing firm does not offer the 
service. In addition, as the competing firm’s service quality increases, the resulting network of 
Firm i would be smaller. Thus, whether the competitor offers a service, and its service quality, 
affect the value a consumer would derive from Firm i’s service, and thus may affect Firm i’s 
decision whether to offer the service. This is not true when the service does not exhibit network 
effects. 
Tables 5 and 6 provide two numerical examples. The profits in these tables are the 
equilibrium profits given the firms choices in the first stage of the game. For the parameters 
values presented in Table 5, both firms provide the service in equilibrium, while for the 
parameters values in Table 6, two equilibriums exist, and only one firm provides the service. 
Firm B 
Firm A 
Only Product Product + Service 
𝑀 = 200, 𝑣 = 50 
𝑡 = 5, 𝑐 = 3  
𝛼 = 𝛾 = 0.015  
𝑠𝐴 = 450, 𝑠𝐵 = 350   
Only Product 500, 500 145, 645 
Product+ Service 788, 88 312, 112 
          Table 5. A numerical example of  Prisoner’s Dilemma  
Firm B 
Firm A 
No Service Service 
𝑀 = 200, 𝑣 = 50 
𝑡 = 5, 𝑐 = 3  
𝛼 =  = 0.02  
𝑠𝐴 = 190, 𝑠𝐵 = 210   
Only Product 500, 500 125, 551 
Product + Service 516, 142 75, 128 
Table 6. A numerical example for two equilibriums 
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Interestingly, the example in Table 5 also illustrates a situation of Prisoner’s Dilemma. The 
two firms’ profits in equilibrium (𝜋𝑆𝑆
𝐴 = 312, 𝜋𝑆𝑆
𝐵 = 112) are less than the profits when neither 
firm offers the service (500). Due to the high service quality of the two firms (𝑠𝐴 > 𝑠𝐵𝑋 + 𝑌 and 
𝑠𝐵 > 𝑠𝐴𝑋 + 𝑌), offering the service is a dominant strategy for both. That is, offering the service 
maximizes a firm’s profit regardless of the strategy chosen by the other firm. However, when 
both firms offer the service, they are both worse off compared to when neither does. Proposition 
2 specifies when a Prisoner Dilemma arises.  
Proposition 2. (Prisoner’s Dilemma) both firms offer the service in equilibrium, even 
though both would enjoy higher profits when both do not operate the service, if and only if: 
𝑠𝐴 > 𝑠𝐵𝑋 + 𝑌, 𝑠𝐵 > 𝑠𝐴𝑋 + 𝑌, and  
    𝑠𝐴 − 𝑠𝐵 <
3 𝛼𝑀−𝑡+ 𝑡 𝑡−𝛼𝑀  
𝛾
     (2) 
According to Proposition 2, if both firms offer the service in equilibrium, then as long as 
neither firm has a significant quality advantage, both firms would be better off when neither 
offers the service. If one firm has a significant quality advantage over the other firm (Inequality 2 
is not satisfied), then the firm with the higher quality is better off when both firms offer the 
service than when neither does, while the other firm is worse off. It is important to note that the 
right-hand-side of Inequality 2 is always positive when parameters values are such that both 
firms offer the service in equilibrium with positive product demand (see proof of Proposition 2).  
Corollary 2 states that a Prisoner’s Dilemma does not take place when the service does not 
exhibit network effects.  
Corollary 2. When the service does not exhibit network effects, a Prisoner’s Dilemma does 
not take place. At least one of the firms is better off when both offer the service compared to 
when both sell only product. 
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When there are no network effects, i.e., when α = 0, the right hand side of Inequality (2) 
becomes 0, and thus the inequality is never satisfied. In addition, if α = 0 then 𝜋𝑆𝑆
𝑖 − 𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝑖 =
𝛾𝑀 𝑠𝑖−𝑠𝑗   6𝑡+𝛾 𝑠𝑖−𝑠𝑗   
18𝑡
 and the latter is positive when 𝑠𝑖 > 𝑠𝑗 . Thus, at least the firm that has the 
higher service quality is better off when both offer the service compared to when neither does. In 
particular, in some cases, both firms are better off.   
The managerial implications of Propositions 1 and 2 are significant. In the past, when firms 
considered offering services to consumers who buy their products, and the services did not 
exhibit network effects, the decision whether to offer the service depended solely on the 
capabilities of the firm; specifically on the quality of the service it can provide and on the 
marginal provision cost. Nowadays, however, when considering to offer an online service with 
network effects, firms have to also take into consideration whether the competitor is offering a 
similar service or not, and the quality of the competitor’s service. In addition, competing firms 
might want to coordinate their service offering decisions, because not doing so might reduce 
both firms’ profits. Such coordination was not necessary (or possible) when the service 
considered did not exhibit network effects, because at least the firm with the higher service 
quality would be better off when both firms offer the service. 
Next, we examine social welfare implications. Proposition 3 lists the conditions under 
which the service is under-provided or over-provided in the market  
Proposition 3.  
i)   The service is under-provided if 𝐹𝐴 𝑠𝐴 , 𝑠𝐵 > 0 and 𝐹
𝐵 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐴 > 0,  and at least one of 
the following conditions hold: 
2𝑐−𝑁𝛼
2𝛾
 < 𝑠𝐴 < 𝑠𝐵𝑋 + 𝑌 or 
2𝑐−𝑁𝛼
2𝛾
< 𝑠𝐵 < 𝑠𝐴𝑋 + 𝑌. 
ii) The service is over-provided if 𝑠𝐴 > 𝑠𝐵𝑋 + 𝑌, 𝑠𝐵 > 𝑠𝐴𝑋 + 𝑌 and at least one of the 
following conditions hold: 𝐹𝐴 𝑠𝐴 , 𝑠𝐵 < 0, or 𝐹
𝐵 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐴 < 0. 
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where  
 𝐹𝑖 𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗   = 𝑆𝑊𝑆𝑆 − 𝑆𝑊𝑖 = 
 
𝛼𝑀2 12𝑡2−15𝛼𝑀𝑡+4𝛼2𝑀2 



















𝑀 𝛼𝑀−2𝑐  36𝑡2+10𝑐𝑡+𝛼𝑀 14𝛼𝑀−47𝑡−4𝑐  
36 2𝑡−𝛼𝑀 2
    (3) 
SWss is social welfare when both firms offer service, and SWi is social welfare when only 
Firm i offers the service. 
  Figure 3 exhibits the results from Proposition 2 when 2𝑐 < 𝑁𝛼. Specifically it shows 
which strategy maximizes social welfare, and when the service is under or over provided. If 2c > 




 and 𝑠𝐵 <
2𝑐−𝑁𝛼
2𝛾
, where 0 <
2𝑐−𝑁𝛼
2𝛾
< s (see Proof of Proposition 3), in which it 
is socially optimal that neither firm offer the service, and in equilibrium indeed neither offer it. 
 
Figure 3. Firms’ strategies that maximize social welfare in the sA-sB space, 
when 2c < αN.  In the range labeled A (B) social welfare is maximized when 
only Firm A (B) offers service.  In the ranges labeled A+B:  social welfare is 
maximizes when both firms offer the service. 
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In Region A in Figure 3, 𝐹𝐴 𝑠𝐴 , 𝑠𝐵 < 0, and social welfare is maximized when only Firm 
A offers the service; in Region B in Figure 3, 𝐹𝐵 𝑠𝐵 , 𝑠𝐴 < 0, and social welfare is maximized 
when only Firm B offers the service; and in all the regions labeled A+B in Figure 3, social 
welfare is maximized when both firms offer the service. Thus, in Regions A and B we observe 
over-provision of the service. This seems surprising, given the high values of sA and sB in these 
regions. In these two regions, both firms offer the service in equilibrium (see Figure 2), but price 
competition reduces the firms’ profits compared to the case in which only one firm offers the 
service. Price competition raises consumer surplus, but the reduction in profits outweighs the 
increase in consumer surplus. On the other hand, when : 𝑠𝐴 < 𝑠𝐵𝑋 + 𝑌 or  𝑠𝐵 < 𝑠𝐴𝑋 + 𝑌, under-
provision of the service is witnessed; it is socially optimal for both firms to operate the service, 
but in equilibrium, there is at most one service provider. 
Next, we examine what happens when the service does not exhibit network effects.  If 
𝑠𝐴 > 𝑠 = c/𝛾  and 𝑠𝐵 > 𝑠 = c/𝛾, then in equilibrium both firms offer the service; specifically 
the line g-h converges with the horizontal line of  𝑠 in Figure 3, while the line d-f converges with 
the vertical 𝑠 (as Y= 𝑠 = 𝑐/𝛾, and X=0). Thus, when 𝑠𝐴 > 𝑠 and 𝑠𝐵 > 𝑠, we never observe under-
provision of the service. The range of parapets values for which we observe under-provision is 
smaller than when there are no network effects.
1
 
We conclude that, supporting previous results regarding under-provision of products with 
network effects in a monopoly setup, social planers should be concerned with under-provision 
when the service exhibits network effects. However, unlike in a monopoly setup, due to the 
competitive setting, they should also be aware that online services might be over-provided. This 
can happen, surprisingly, when the inherent value of the services is high.   
                                                          
1
 When sA<𝑠  or sB< 𝑠, the only inefficiently possible is under-provision (which is true also when α >0). 
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5. Network Effects and Profitability 
In this section, we examine whether firms benefit from an increase in the degree of network 
effects, α, and from an increase in the market size, M. Both of these changes seem intuitively 
positive for the firms as they can lead to higher service valuation by consumers (larger market 
size, M, leads to larger network size, and α is the marginal valuation for the network). However, 
we find that as the degree of network effects (α) increases or as the market size (M) increases, the 
profits of both firms may in fact decrease. These results are presented in Propositions 4 and 5 
respectively. 
Proposition 4.  When both firms have positive product demand 
i) If both firms offer the service in equilibrium, the profit of each of the firms decreases as 
the degree of network effects increases.   
ii) When only Firm i  offers the service in equilibrium, its profit increases as the degree of 
network effects increases if and only if  
    𝑠𝑖 >
𝑡−𝛼𝑀+𝑐
𝛾
.       (4) 
The profit of the other firm always decreases as the degree of network effects increases. 
According to Proposition 4, firms often do not benefit from an increase in the degree of 
network effects. When both firms offer the service, the benefit from an increase in the degree of 
network effects goes to consumers, and, although the demand for the product increases, the 
intensified price competition (as can be seen from Table 3, both prices decrease as α increases) 
reduces both firms’ profits. In contrast, if , the marginal valuation for the inherent 
functionalities of the service, increases, then the profit of the firm with the higher service quality 
increases, while the profit of the other firm decreases. 
The implications are again important. While the firm that offers the higher service quality 
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always benefits from an increase in , it might not benefit from an increase in α. Only if its 
service quality is high enough (see Equation 4) and the competing firm does not offer the 
service, a firm can benefit from an increase in the degree of network effects. 
Proposition 5. When both firms have positive product demand 
i) If both firms offer the service in equilibrium, then the profit of Firm i increases in the size 
of the market (M) if and only if  
   𝑠𝑖 − 𝑠𝑗 >
3 2𝛼𝑀−𝑡 (𝑡−𝛼𝑀)
𝑡
.       (5) 
ii) If only firm i offers the service, then Firm i’s profit increases in the size of the market (M) 
if and only if  









          (6) 
According to Proposition 5-(i), when both firms offer the service and the service exhibits 
network effects, in some cases even the profit of the firm with the higher service quality 
decreases as M increases. This happens if 𝑀 > 𝑡/2𝛼 (so that the RHS of (5) is positive) and the 
difference between the two service qualities (si and sj) is not large enough. In contrast, when the 
service does not exhibit network effects, the firm with the higher service quality always benefits 
from an increase in the market size, M (as the RHS of Inequality 5 is negative when α = 0). 
Similarly, from Proposition 5-(ii), we see that if only Firm i offers the service in 
equilibrium, there are cases in which Firm i profit decreases as M increases, a situation that does 
not happen when the service does not exhibit network effects.  
The above propositions show that, when both firms offer the service, an increase in α 
always leads to a reduction in the profit of both firms, while an increase in the market size M can 
cause a reduction in both profits if the difference in qualities (𝑠𝐴 − 𝑠𝐵) is small (else, it causes a 
reduction only in the profit of the firm with the lower quality). Thus, a seemingly favorable 
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exogenous change (an increase in α or in M) may undermine the profitability of the entire 
industry. What drives this counterintuitive result? 
Without loss of generality, suppose 𝑠𝐴 > 𝑠𝐵. When both firms offer the service, the 










𝑡−𝛼𝑀+𝛾 𝑠𝐵−𝑠𝐴  +𝑐+𝑝𝑠𝑠
𝐴
2
   (7) 
Examining how the best response price of Firm A (B) changes with the degree of network 










𝐴  = −
𝑀
2
,       (8) 
Equation 8 demonstrates that as α becomes greater, Firm A has to lower its price (𝑝𝑆𝑆
𝐴 ) for 
a given price of Firm B. The same holds for Firm B.  
Why does the price competition become more intense as the degree of network effects 
increases? From the demand functions, we can show that given the prices of two firms, the price 
elasticity of demand (𝑒𝐷,𝑝) for Firm A is decreasing in α  
𝜕
𝜕𝛼
𝑒𝐷,𝑝 < 0 , implying that the higher 
α, the more elastic the demand becomes. With a higher α, marginal customers who are 
indifferent to either firm react to a change in price more sensitively. The firms need to lower 
their price to accommodate such elastic demand. This explains why the optimal price decreases 
in α. We can show that this is also the case with respect to an increase in the market size (M). 
Specifically, while an increase in M increases the demand, the prices of both firms always 
decrease in the market size M. 
This finding illustrates an instance of a Bertrand supertrap. Cabral and Villas-Boas 
(2005) define a Bertrand supertrap as a situation in which a common, industry-wide change in 
some exogenous parameter leads to an increase in profits when prices are held constant, but 
ultimately to a decrease in firms’ equilibrium profits. Specifically, the direct effect of an 
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exogenous change (i.e., the effect on profits while the firms do not adjust the prices) is positive, 
whereas the total effect on profits after price adjustments is negative due to a strong negative 
strategic effect (i.e., intensification of price competition). In our context, the common change in 
some exogenous parameter is the increase in α or M. It can be shown that if the two prices (𝑝𝑠𝑠
𝐴  
and 𝑝𝑠𝑠
𝐵 ) of two firms are unchanged, the profit of the firm with the higher si always increases in 
α or M. However, as Propositions 4 and 5 indicate, the strategic effect can reduce the equilibrium 
profits of the two firms. 
6. The Service Development Decision 
This section extends our base model to consider the case in which each firm incurs a 
development cost, and can endogenously choose the quality of its service (si). We examine 
whether a Prisoner’s Dilemma and a Bertland supertrap can emerge even when the service 
quality is endogenous, or perhaps firms can break out of such jeopardy by strategically choosing 
their service quality.  
The game described in Section 3 is modified as follows. In the first stage of the game, each 
firm decides whether to develop the service at a cost of 𝐶(𝑠𝑖), where 𝐶
′ 𝑠𝑖 > 0 and 𝐶
′′  𝑠𝑖 > 0. 
In this extension, we assume that 𝐶 𝑠𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖
2 where 𝑐𝑖 > 0, and ci indicates the development 
capability of Firm i. Firms can differ in their development cost as some may have an internal 
department of developers while others outsource the project. The firm with the lower ci has the 
cost advantage. Next, in the second stage of the game, sA and sB are observed, and both firms 
simultaneously decide whether to offer service to consumers who buy their product. In the next 
stage, prices are set, and, finally, in the last stage of the game, consumers choose whether to buy 
a product and from which firm. For a given result of the first stage of the game, i.e., for given 
values of sA and sB, the following three stages are the same as the game described in Section 3. 
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Thus, for each (sA,sB) pair that can be chosen in the first stage of the game described here
2
, the 
equilibrium is determined by Proposition 1, and the profit of Firm i  is: 
  𝛑𝑖(𝑠𝐴 , 𝑠𝐵) = 𝐺
𝑖(𝑠𝐴 , 𝑠𝐵) − 𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖
2             
Where 






𝑖 (𝑠𝐴 , 𝑠𝐵)
𝜋𝑆𝑁
𝑖 (𝑠𝐴 , 𝑠𝐵)
𝜋𝑁𝑆




If both choose to offer the service in the 2
nd
 stage 
If only A chooses to offer the service in the 2
nd
 stage 
If only B chooses to offer the service in the 2
nd
 stage 
If neither chooses to offer the service in the 2
nd
 stage 
      The expressions for πk
i  are given in Table 4. Notice that in general, a firm might invest in 
developing the service in the first stage of the game, incurring the fixed development cost, but 
then after observing the competitor’s service quality in the second stage of the game, it might 
decide not to offer its service (in the second stage of the game any development cost is sunk, and 
the firm might expect higher profit when not offering the service). However, this situation would 
not happen in equilibrium.  
 Table 7 exhibits the Firms’ optimal service quality choices, for the four possible outcomes 
of the second stage of the game (the stage in which firms chooses if to offer their service). For 
example, Firm A’s optimal service quality choice if it predicts that Firm B will choose not to 
offer service in the 2
nd
 stage of the game, is 𝑠𝐴 =
𝛾𝑀 3𝑡−𝛼𝑀−𝑐 
9𝑐𝐴  2𝑡−𝛼𝑀 −𝛾2𝑀
, while  if Firm A predicts that 
Firm B will offer service, its optimal service quality is 𝑠𝐴 =
𝛾𝑀 9𝑐𝐵  𝑡−𝛼𝑀 −𝛾
2𝑀 
54𝑐𝐴𝑐𝐵  𝑡−𝛼𝑀 −3𝛾2𝑀 𝑐𝐴+𝑐𝐵  
. The 
resulting payoff matrix of profits, as given in Table 8, was obtained by substituting the values of 
sA and sB from Table 7 in the profit expressions from Table 4. 
With the payoff matrix of profits, Table 8, we can numerically determine the equilibrium 
                                                          
2
 Where a choice not to develop the service can be represented by 𝑠𝑖 = 0.  
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(sA, sB) values for any set of parameters values (M, c, t, α, , cA and cB). We cannot derive an 
equivalent proposition to Proposition 1, stating which equilibrium prevails under given 
conditions on parameters values, as the inequalities are too complex. 
Firm B 
Firm A 
Only Product Product+ Service 
Only Product N/A 𝑠𝐵 =
𝛾𝑀 3𝑡−𝛼𝑀−𝑐 
9𝑐𝐵 2𝑡−𝛼𝑀 −𝛾2𝑀








𝛾𝑀 9𝑐𝐵 𝑡−𝛼𝑀 −𝛾
2𝑀 
54𝑐𝐴𝑐𝐵 𝑡−𝛼𝑀 −3𝛾2𝑀 𝑐𝐴+𝑐𝐵 
  
𝑠𝐵 =
𝛾𝑀 9𝑐𝐴 𝑡−𝛼𝑀 −𝛾
2𝑀 
54𝑐𝐴𝑐𝐵 𝑡−𝛼𝑀 −3𝛾2𝑀 𝑐𝐴+𝑐𝐵 
  
Table 7. The equilibrium service qualities 
Firm B 
Firm A 
Only Product Product + Service 
Only Product 
𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝐴 = 0.5𝑀𝑡 
𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝐵 = 0.5𝑀𝑡 
𝜋𝑁𝑆
𝐴 =
𝑀 2𝑡−𝛼𝑀  3𝑐𝐵  3𝑡−2𝛼𝑀+𝑐 −𝛾
2𝑀 
2





















𝑀 2𝑡−𝛼𝑀  3𝑐𝐴  3𝑡−2𝛼𝑀+𝑐 −𝛾
2𝑀 
2





𝑐𝐴𝑀 18𝑐𝐴  𝑡−𝛼𝑀 −𝛾
2𝑀  9𝑐𝐵  𝑡−𝛼𝑀 −𝛾
2𝑀 
2
9 18𝑐𝐴 𝑐𝐵  𝑡−𝛼𝑀 −𝛾
2𝑀 𝑐𝐴+𝑐𝐵   
2   
𝜋𝑆𝑆
𝐵 =
𝑐𝐵𝑀 18𝑐𝐵  𝑡−𝛼𝑀 −𝛾
2𝑀  9𝑐𝐴  𝑡−𝛼𝑀 −𝛾
2𝑀 
2
9 18𝑐𝐴 𝑐𝐵  𝑡−𝛼𝑀 −𝛾
2𝑀 𝑐𝐴+𝑐𝐵   
2   
Table 8. The equilibrium profits when quality is endogenous  
Figure 4 display the resulting equilibrium in the cA-cB space for a given instance of 
parameters values. We find that when service qualities are endogenous, both firms offer the 
service in equilibrium when cA and cB are sufficiently low and close enough to each other. If both 
firms incur a high enough development cost then in equilibrium neither offers the service. In all 
other cases, in equilibrium only one firm offer the service 
We also see from Figure 4 that, as before, there is a range of parameters values in which 
two equilibriums may prevail. Specifically, in the range labeled SN|NS, each firm would offer 
the service only if the competitor does not. Thus, there can be a first mover advantage, and an 
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equilibrium in which the firm with the higher development cost is the only one offering a service 
may prevail.  
 
Figure 4. The market equilibrium in the cA-cB space. 
We also find that a Prisoner’s Dilemma can arise when both firms offer the service in 
equilibrium, as shown in the numerical example in Table 9. 
Firm B 
Firm A 
Only Product Product + Service 
𝑀 = 150, 𝑣 = 50 
𝑡 = 5, 𝑐 = 0.01  
𝛼 = 𝛾 = 0.015  
𝑐𝐴 = 𝑐𝐵 = 0.004   
Only Product 375, 375 127.04, 379.16 
Product+ Service 379.16, 127.04 127.15, 127.15 
Table 9. A numerical example of Prisoner’s Dilemma when service qualities are endogenous  
Next we examine how an increase in the degree of network effects changes profitability. 
The results are given in Proposition 6. 
Proposition 6. When both firms offer the service with positive demand, as the degree of 
network effects increases: 
i) The equilibrium service quality of Firm i increases if 𝑐𝑖 < 𝑐𝑗 , unchanged if 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐𝑗 , and 
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decreases otherwise. 
ii) The profit of firm i increases if 𝑐𝑖 < 𝑈(𝑐𝑗 ), and decreases if  𝑈(𝑐𝑗 )< 𝑐𝑖 < 𝑐𝑗 , where both 
ranges are none-empty as long as 𝑐𝑖 < 𝑐𝑗 , and  
𝑈 𝑐𝑗  =
2𝛾2𝑐𝑗𝑀
27𝑐𝑗  𝑡−𝛼𝑀 − 81𝑐𝑗
2 𝑡−𝛼𝑀 2+36𝛾2𝑐𝑗𝑀 𝑡−𝛼𝑀 −4𝛾
2𝑀2
     (9) 
From Proposition 6, we learn that when both firms choose to offer the service in 
equilibrium, as the degree of network effects increases, the firm with the higher development 
cost is always worse off; it will choose an even lower service quality, and its profit will decrease. 
In contrast, the firm with the lower development cost would choose a higher service quality and 
it may be better off;  that is its profit may increase. Thus, when service qualities were held fixed 
(exogenous), we found that both firms’ profits necessarily decrease as the degree of network 
effects increases. However, when service qualities are endogenous, the firm with the lower 
development cost might be able (if its cost is low enough) to benefit from the increase in the 
degree of network effects.  
Since the profit of the firm with the cost advantage might also decrease as the degree of 
network effects increases, Proposition 6 shows that even when the firms can adjust the level of 
service quality, they may still be caught in a Bertrand Supertrap. Similar results hold when 
examining how a change in the market size, M, affects profitability. In particular, when both 
firms offer the service in equilibrium and 𝑐𝐴 = 𝑐𝐵 it can be shown that the equilibrium quality 
level always increases in the size of the market (M), but under general conditions on parameters 
values,  both firms’ profit decreases in M, (for example, t <2𝛼𝑀 is a sufficient condition for such a 
profit reduction) . 
Proposition 7 introduces another type of a Bertrand Supertrap. It considers a case in 
which technological development reduces the development costs of both firms and examines 
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how such an exogenous change shapes the industry’s profitability.  
Proposition 7. Suppose 𝑐𝐴 = 𝑘𝑑𝐴, 𝑐𝐵 = 𝑘𝑑𝐵 and 𝑑𝐴 < 𝑑𝐵. When both firms offer the service in 
equilibrium, the profit of Firm A increases in k if and only if  
 𝑑𝐴
2 96𝑑𝐵𝑘
2 𝑡 − 𝛼𝑀 2 − 𝑑𝐴 24𝑑𝐵
2𝑘2 𝑡 − 𝛼𝑀 2 + 30𝛾2𝑑𝐵𝑘𝑀 𝑡 − 𝛼𝑀 − 𝛾
2𝑀2 + 
               𝛾2𝑑𝐵𝑀 6𝑑𝐵𝑘 𝑡 − 𝛼𝑀 + 𝛾
2𝑀  > 0.  
The profit of Firm B always increases in k. 
Proposition 7 describes an interesting phenomenon. It shows that as k decreases, i.e. as 
service development becomes less costly for both firms, even the firm with the stronger 
development capability (𝑑𝐴 < 𝑑𝐵) may experience a profit reduction. The profit of the other firm 
always decreases as k decreases. 
7. Heterogeneous Service Valuations 
For simplicity, in the base model we assume that consumers are homogenous in terms of their 
service valuations. Specifically, all consumers have the same marginal valuation for an 
improvement in the quality of the service () or for an increase in the network size (α). Thus, 
whether the seller offers the service separately for a fee, f, and the product for a price p, or 
whether he offers the two bundled for a single price, pB
3
, demand and profit would be the same. 
This simplification allowed us to focus on how firms should adjust their strategies when offering 
a service that exhibits network effects.  
In contrast, when consumers have heterogeneous service valuations (either because they 
have heterogeneous   values, or heterogeneous α values, or both), the profit and demand when 
selling the service separately for a fee might be different from the profit and demand when the 
service is sold bundled with the product. If consumers have heterogeneous service valuations, 
                                                          
3
 Which is the same as selling the product for price pB , and offering the service “free of charge” 
- 31 - 
when the seller offers the service separately for a fee, some consumers might choose to buy only 
the product, while others buy both product and service. This situation is not possible when the 
service is offered bundled with the product. Thus, the two strategies can lead to different profits. 
We analyzed an alternative model, in which there are two types of consumers in terms of 
service valuations. Consumers in Group 1 have marginal valuation for the inherent 
functionalities of the service 1, and for the network of service users α1, while consumers in 
Group 2 have marginal valuation for inherent service quality, 2, and for network of service users 
α2. Proportion β of the population belong to Group 1 while the rest are in Group 2, and without 
loss of generality we assume 𝛼1 > 𝛼2 and 𝛾1 > 𝛾2 . That is, we assume that consumers with 
higher valuations for the inherent functionalities of the service also have higher marginal 
valuation for the network related functionalities.  
In the first stage of the game, each firm chooses whether to offer the service bundled with 
the product, sell it separately for a fee, or not sell it at all. In the second stage of the game, firms 
observe the choices made, and set prices accordingly. In the last stage, consumers decide from 
which firm to obtain the product and, if service is sold separately, decide whether to buy the 
service. In this model there are more possible market configurations than in the base model 
presented in Section 3. Specifically, there are 9 possible outcomes for the first stage of the game. 
Thus, for this model, the conditions that need to be satisfied for each possible equilibrium to 
prevail are very complex, and rather than deriving a proposition similar to Proposition 1, we 
derived the equilibrium numerically for different sets of parameters values. Table 10 presents the 
resulting equilibrium in the sA-sB space for one set of parameters values (profits expressions for 
each possible configuration can be obtained from the authors). The results presents in Table 10 
are representative of any set of parameters values we have examined.  
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From Table 10, we learn that Firm i offers a bundle for high si values, sells the service 
separately for mid-range si values and does not sell the service for small si values. We note that, 
thought this is not exhibited in Table 10, we found that the boundary values (for si) may increase 
as the competitor’s service quality, sj, decrease.  
sA 
           sB 
160 200 240 280 320 360 400 440 480 
160 NN NN Ns Ns Ns Ns NS NS NS 
200 NN NN Ns Ns Ns Ns NS NS NS 
240 sN sN ss ss ss sS sS sS sS 
280 sN sN ss ss ss sS sS sS sS 
320 sN sN ss ss ss sS sS sS sS 
360 sN sN ss Ss Ss Ss | sS sS sS sS 
400 SN SN Ss Ss Ss Ss SS SS SS 
440 SN SN Ss Ss Ss Ss SS SS SS 
480 SN SN Ss Ss Ss Ss SS SS SS 
𝑀 = 200, 𝑣 = 50, 𝑡 = 5, 𝑐 = 3,𝛼1 = 0.015,𝛼2 = 0.01,𝛾1 = 0.015, 𝛾2 = 0.01,𝛽 = 0.3  
- S: sells a bundle.  (e.g., Ss- Firm A sells a  bundle) 
- s: sells the service separately.   (e.g., Ss, Firm B sells service separately) 
- N:  the firm sells only the product.   
- Several equilibriums for the same cell are separated by |. 
- NA – No equilibrium exists.  
         Table 10. Market equilibrium when consumers have heterogeneous service valuations  
 
All the results from Section 5 still hold when parameters values are such that both firms 
sell a bundle in equilibrium, or when one firm sells a bundle while the other does not offer the 
service. That is, we can still show the existence of a Prisoner’s Dilemma, and that the firms profit 
decreases as the degree of network effects increase. However, with heterogeneous service 
valuations, there are additional market configurations that need to be studied (such as when both 
firms sell the service separately). We leave such examination, which would have to be done 
numerically, for future work.  
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8. Conclusions 
An increasing number of firms have been realizing that in order to remain competitive they can 
no longer only sell products, but they have to provide their customers with value adding services. 
The nature of such services has been changing though. While in the past, services were mainly 
limited to maintenance, installation, repair, and periodic updates, nowadays many services can be 
delivered online. Especially, advances in technology allow firms to deliver services that create 
value by enabling interactions between the firms’ customers, who often benefit from such 
connectivity as they have common interests and goals. 
While the profitability of offering product related services has been studied before, this is 
the first paper to examine how the switch from traditional services to online services with 
network effects changes the competitive outcomes and firms profitability. We find that, unlike 
when considering to offer a service without network effects, when considering an online service 
with network effects, firms have to also take into consideration whether the competitor is 
offering a similar service or not, and  the quality of the competitor’s service. In addition, 
competing firms might want to coordinate their service offering decisions, because not doing so 
might reduce both firms’ profits. We also show that in many cases an increase in the degree of 
network effects actually reduces both firms profit. Thus, advances in technology which may 
benefit a monopoly, actually intensify competition and cause a reduction in profits.  
Future work can examine a model with heterogeneous service valuations to determine 
how network effects change profitability when firms sell the service separately for a fee. When 
service is sold separately, some consumers can buy only the product and pay less than consumers 
who buy both product and service. In addition, this alternative model can be studied to determine 
how network effects can influence the decision whether to sell a bundle or sell the service 
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separately. Intuition predicts that as network effects intensify the incentive to sell the service 
bundled with the product increases, as this increases the size of the network of service users.  
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Appendix 1.  
Derivations of Equilibrium in the Second and Third Stages of the Game 
We derive the equilibrium in prices and demands given the choices of the two firms in the first 
stage of the game. We consider only cases in which i) each firm has positive demand for its 
product, and ii) the market for the product  is covered and firms face spatial competition.  
1. Case NN: Both Firms Sell Only Product 
When neither firm operates the service, the surplus a consumer obtains when buying the product 
sold by Firm A, and the surplus he obtains when buying the product sold by Firm B, are given 
respectively by 
 𝑢𝑁𝑁
𝐴 = 𝑉 − 𝑡𝑥 − 𝑝𝑁𝑁
𝐴          (A1) 
 𝑢𝑁𝑁
𝐵 = 𝑉 − 𝑡(1 − 𝑥) − 𝑝𝑁𝑁
𝐵 ,        (A2) 
For spatial competition (the market is covered and the marginal customer has positive utility) 
to be the equilibrium outcome, it must be that V >1.5t. It is easy to show that when this condition 
holds, in equilibrium the product price is 
 𝑝𝑁𝑁
𝐴 ∗ = 𝑝𝑁𝑁
𝐵 ∗ =t.         (A3) 
The market share of each firm is 0.5N, and the profits are given by 
 𝑁𝑁
𝐴 ∗ = 𝑁𝑁
𝐵 ∗ = 0.5 𝑁𝑡.         (A4) 
If 𝑡 < 𝑉 < 1.5𝑡, then the market is still covered, but the indifferent customer obtains zero 
utility. In this case,  𝑝𝑁𝑁
𝐴 ∗ = 𝑝𝑁𝑁
𝐵 ∗ = 𝑉 − 0.5𝑡. Finally, if V<t, then in equilibrium market is not 
covered. In this paper we limit our attention to cases of spatial competition, that is, we assume V 
>1.5t (see Assumption 1 in Appendix 2). 
2. Cases SN and NS: Only One Firm Offers a Service 
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W.L.O.G we assume that only Firm A decided to offer a service to its customers. The solution 
when only firm B offers the service can be derived in a similar manner.  
When expected network size (i.e., the expected number of consumers that buy from Firm A) 
is NA, consumer’s surplus when buying from firm A, 𝑢𝑆𝑁
𝐴 , and when buying from Firm B, 𝑢𝑆𝑁
𝐵  
are given by: 
 𝑢𝑆𝑁
𝐴 = 𝑉 − 𝑡𝑥 + 𝑠𝐴 + 𝛼𝑁𝐴 − 𝑝𝑆𝑁
𝐴        (A5) 
 𝑢𝑆𝑁
𝐵 = 𝑉 − 𝑡(1 − 𝑥) − 𝑝𝑆𝑁
𝐵         (A6) 
The location of the customer who is indifferent between the two firms, denoted by 𝑥 , is  





        (A7) 
The demand for the product and service of Firm A, 𝐷𝑆𝑁
𝐴  , given that consumers expect the 
number of service uses to be NA, is thus given by 𝑀𝑥  𝑁𝐴 . In a Fulfilled Expectation 
Equilibrium, we require that  
 𝐷𝑆𝑁
𝐴 = 𝑀𝑥  𝐷𝑆𝑁
𝐴  .         (A8) 
Solving the above equation for 𝐷𝑆𝑁







.        (A9) 
Given our assumption that the market is covered, the demand for product B is given by 𝐷𝑆𝑁
𝐵 =
𝑀 −𝐷𝑆𝑁
𝐴 . Finally, the profit functions of two firms are given by 𝜋𝑆𝑁
𝐴 = 𝐷𝑆𝑁
𝐴  𝑝𝑆𝑁




𝐵 .   
Solving the first-order conditions simultaneously (S.O.C is satisfied when 2t >αM, where 
the latter condition must hold in order for both firms to have positive demand when both offer 









    (A10) 
- 38 - 
 𝜋𝑆𝑁
𝐴 ∗ =
𝑀 3𝑡−𝑐−𝛼𝑀+𝛾𝑆𝐴  
2
9 2𝑡−𝛼𝑀 
,        𝜋𝑆𝑁
𝐵 ∗ =
𝑀 3𝑡+𝑐−2𝛼𝑀−𝛾𝑆𝐴  
2
9 2𝑡−𝛼𝑀 
.    (A11) 
At above prices, the condition for both firms to have positive demand (i.e., 0 < 𝐷𝑆𝑁





 < 𝑠𝐴 <
3𝑡−2𝛼𝑀+𝑐
𝛾
,         (A12) 
To insure spatial competition at above prices, we need to find the surplus of the customer 
indifferent between the two products and require it to be positive. Doing so we get the following 
condition 
 𝑉 >
 3𝑡−𝛼𝑀  3𝑡+𝑐−2𝛼𝑀−𝛾𝑆𝐴  
6𝑡−3𝛼𝑀
.         (A13) 
3. Case SS: Both Firms offer a Service 
When both firms offer the service, the utility functions are given by 
  𝑢𝑠𝑠
𝐴 = 𝑉 − 𝑡𝑥 + 𝑠𝐴 + 𝛼𝑁𝐴 − 𝑝𝑠𝑠
𝐴        (A14) 
 𝑢𝑠𝑠
𝐵 = 𝑉 − 𝑡(1 − 𝑥)+𝑠𝐵 + 𝛼𝑁𝐵−𝑝𝑠𝑠
𝐵       (A15) 
The location of indifferent customer 𝑥  is found by solving 𝑢𝑆𝑆
𝐴 = 𝑢𝑆𝑆
𝐵  and is given by 
 𝑥 (𝑁𝐴 ,𝑁𝐵) =




      (A16) 
The demand for the product and service of Firm A, 𝐷𝑆𝑆
𝐴  , given consumers expectations 
regarding networks sizes, is 𝑀𝑥  𝑁𝐴 ,𝑁𝐵 , and the demand for the product and service of Firm 
B, 𝐷𝑆𝑆
𝐵  , given the assumption that market is covered is 𝑀 −𝐷𝑆𝑆
𝐴  . In the Fulfilled Expectation 
equilibrium, we require that  
 𝐷𝑆𝑆
𝐴 = 𝑀𝑥  𝐷𝑆𝑆
𝐴 ,𝐷𝑆𝑆
𝐵    and  𝐷𝑆𝑆
𝐵 = 𝑀 1 − 𝑥  𝐷𝑆𝑆
𝐴 ,𝐷𝑆𝑆
𝐵   .    (A17) 
Solving the above two equations simultaneously for  𝐷𝑆𝑆
𝐴  and 𝐷𝑆𝑆
𝐵 , we get 
 𝐷𝐵
𝐴 =










.   (A18) 
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𝑖 − 𝑐  (i = A and B).       (A19) 
Solving the first order conditions simultaneously (S.O.C are satisfied when αM > t, a condition 
which we shortly show is satisfied when both firms have positive demand in equilibrium), we 
find the equilibrium prices: 
 𝑝𝑆𝑆
𝐴 = 𝑡 + 𝑐 − 𝛼𝑀 + 𝛾
(𝑠𝐴−𝑠𝐵 )
3
,       𝑝𝑠𝑠
𝐵 = 𝑡 + 𝑐 − 𝛼𝑀 + 𝛾
(𝑠𝐵−𝑠𝐴 )
3  
  (A20) 
The profits at the optimal prices are given by 
 𝜋𝑆𝑆
𝐴 =
𝑀 3(𝑡−𝛼𝑀)+𝛾 𝑠𝐴−𝑠𝐵   
2
18(𝑡−𝛼𝑀)
,           𝜋𝑆𝑆
𝐵 =
𝑀 3(𝑡−𝛼𝑀)+𝛾 𝑠𝐵−𝑠𝐴   
2
18(𝑡−𝛼𝑀)
.   (A21) 
The condition for both firms to have positive demand (i.e., the marginal customer’s location is 
interior) is 
  𝑠𝐴 − 𝑠𝐵 <
3 𝑡−𝛼𝑀 
𝛾
  ,         (A22) 
which also require that 
 𝑡 > 𝛼𝑀.          (A23) 
Finally, with above prices there is spatial competition if and only if: 
 𝑉 >
3(𝑡−𝛼𝑁)+2𝑐−𝛾 𝑠𝐴+𝑠𝐵  
2
         (A24) 
 
  
- 40 - 
Appendix  2 – Proofs 
Before we provide the proofs of all propositions, we introduce the following parameter 
assumptions, which guarantee that regardless of which strategy each firm chooses, the market for 
the product is covered and each firm has a positive demand.   
Assumption 1.  




 < 𝑠𝑖 <
3𝑡−2𝛼𝑀+𝑐
𝛾
 (i = A and B)      (A26) 
(iii)  𝑠𝐴 − 𝑠𝐵 <
3 𝑡−𝛼𝑀 
𝛾
        (A27) 




 3𝑡−𝛼𝑀  3𝑡+𝑐−2𝛼𝑀−𝛾𝑠𝐴  
6𝑡−3𝛼𝑀
,
 3𝑡−𝛼𝑀  3𝑡+𝑐−2𝛼𝑀−𝛾𝑠𝐵  
6𝑡−3𝛼𝑀
,
3(𝑡−𝛼𝑀)+2𝑐−𝛾 𝑠𝐴+𝑠𝐵  
2
   
Assumption 1-(ii) ensures that, an equilibrium in which firms face spatial competition and 
both firms have positive product demand is possible when only one of the firms offers the 
service (it was derived by requiring  0 < 𝐷𝑆𝑁
𝐴 < 𝑀 and 0 < 𝐷𝑆𝑁
𝐵 < 𝑀) ; while Assumption 1-(iii) 
ensures an equilibrium in which both firms have positive demand is possible when both firms 
offer the service (it was derived by requiring 0 < 𝐷𝑆𝑆
𝐴 < 𝑀 and 0 < 𝐷𝑆𝑆
𝐵 < 𝑀) . 
Assumption 1-(i) is necessary for the condition given in Assumption 1-(iii) to be satisfied 
for some parameter values.  If Condition (i) is not satisfied, then t, the per unit misfit cost, is 
small relative to the potential network effects, and thus in equilibrium all consumers will choose 
to buy the product and the service from one firm. That is, the strong network effects will 
dominate the cost of misfit for those consumers who buy a product that does not match their 
ideal product.  Assumption 1-(i) also implies that the range given in Assumption 1-(ii) is not 
empty (i.e. 2𝑡 > 𝛼𝑀, and thus 𝑐 − 3𝑡 + 𝛼𝑀 < 3𝑡 − 2𝛼𝑀 + 𝑐). 
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Finally, Assumption 1-(iv) ensures that the inherent value of the product, V,  is sufficiently 
high so that the market for the product is covered by the two firms, whether both, neither or only 
one firm offer the service. 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Having obtained the optimal prices and profits in Appendix 1 (see also Tables 3 and 4 in the 
paper) for each of the four possible market configurations, we now derive the conditions for each 
possible market equilibrium. The conditions are derived as follows: 
i) Both firms offer the service in equilibrium if and only if 𝜋𝑆𝑆
𝐴 > 𝜋𝑁𝑆
𝐴  and 𝜋𝑆𝑆
𝐵 > 𝜋𝑆𝑁
𝐵 . 
ii) Both firms sell only product in equilibrium if and only if 𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝐴 > 𝜋𝑆𝑁
𝐴   and 𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝐵 > 𝜋𝑁𝑆
𝐵 . 
iii) Only firm A offers a service in equilibrium if and only if 𝜋𝑆𝑁
𝐴 > 𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝐴  and 𝜋𝑆𝑁
𝐵 > 𝜋𝑆𝑆
𝐵 . 
iv) Only firm B offers a service in equilibrium if and only if 𝜋𝑁𝑆
𝐴 > 𝜋𝑆𝑆
𝐴  and 𝜋𝑁𝑆
𝐵 > 𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝐵 . 
Equilibrium in which neither firm offers the service 
An equilibrium in which neither firm provides the service exists if and only if 𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝐴 > 𝜋𝑆𝑁
𝐴   and 
𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝐵 > 𝜋𝑁𝑆
𝐵 , so that neither firm has incentive to deviate and offer the service. 
From the profit equations in Table 4, we find that 𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝐴 > 𝜋𝑆𝑁
𝐴   and 𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝐵 > 𝜋𝑁𝑆
𝐵




 (i = A and B)       (A29) 
We denote this upper bound by 𝑠 .  
Equilibrium in which both firms offer the service 





𝐵 , so that neither firm has incentive to deviate and not sell the service. These two 
conditions are given by 
 𝑠𝑖 > 𝑠𝑗𝑋 + 𝑌  for (i = A , j = B) and for (i = B, j = A),      
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where 𝑋 = 1 −
 2𝑡−2𝛼𝑀
 2𝑡−𝛼𝑀
 and 𝑌 =
 3𝑡+𝑐−2𝛼𝑀  2𝑡−2𝛼𝑀




.   (A30) 
Equilibrium in which only one firm offers the service 
The conditions under which there is an equilibrium in which only Firm A offers the service are: 
(i) 𝜋𝑆𝑁
𝐵 > 𝜋𝑆𝑆
𝐵  and (ii) 𝜋𝑆𝑁
𝐴 > 𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝐴 . Condition (i) implies that Firm B does not have an incentive 
to deviate and start offering the service. Condition (ii) indicates that Firm A does not have an 
incentive to deviate and not offer the service. Conditions (i) and (ii) translate to 𝑠𝐵 < 𝑠𝐴𝑋 + 𝑌 
and 𝑠𝐴 > 𝑠 , respectively. The conditions under which an equilibrium in which only Firm B sells 
the service is feasible can be derived in a similar manner. 
Showing that (𝑠 𝑋 + 𝑌) − 𝑠 >0:  
(𝑠 𝑋 + 𝑌) − 𝑠 =
3 𝑡−𝛼𝑀  2 2𝑡−𝛼𝑀 − 𝑡−𝛼𝑀− 𝑡 
𝛾
 .      (A31) 
Given Assumption 1, t> 𝛼𝑀 and thus the nominator is positive iff  2 2𝑡 − 𝛼𝑀 −  𝑡 − 𝛼𝑀 −
 𝑡 > 0.Since a-b=(a-b)
2
 /(a+b), we can rewrite the latter expression as:  
 2 2𝑡 − 𝛼𝑀 −  𝑡 − 𝛼𝑀 −  𝑡 =
  2 2𝑡−𝛼𝑀  
2
−  𝑡−𝛼𝑀+ 𝑡 
2
 2 2𝑡−𝛼𝑀 + 𝑡−𝛼𝑀+ 𝑡
 .    (A32) 
Finally,   2 2𝑡 − 𝛼𝑀  
2
−   𝑡 − 𝛼𝑀 +  𝑡 
2
= 2𝑡 − 𝛼𝑀 − 2 𝑡 𝑡 − 𝛼𝑀 > 0, where the last 
inequality holds because  2𝑡 − 𝛼𝑀 − 2 𝑡 𝑡 − 𝛼𝑀 =
 2𝑡−𝛼𝑀 2− 2 𝑡 𝑡−𝛼𝑀 
2






Proof of Proposition 2 
The inequalities 𝑠𝐴 > 𝑠𝐵𝑋 + 𝑌 and 𝑠𝐵 > 𝑠𝐴𝑋 + 𝑌 represent the conditions under which both 
firms offer the service in equilibrium. The condition  𝑠𝐴 − 𝑠𝐵 <
3 𝛼𝑀−𝑡+ 𝑡 𝑡−𝛼𝑀  
𝛾
 is derived 
from 𝜋𝑆𝑆
𝐴 < 𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝐴  and 𝜋𝑆𝑆
𝐵 < 𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝐵 . 
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Finally we show that  𝛼𝑀 − 𝑡 +  𝑡 𝑡 − 𝛼𝑀   is always positive when there is positive demand 
for both firms (which implies t> 𝛼𝑀 , as stated in Assumption 1): 
  𝑡 𝑡 − 𝛼𝑀 −  𝑡 − 𝛼𝑀 =
𝑡 𝑡−𝛼𝑀 − 𝑡−𝛼𝑀 2
 𝑡 𝑡−𝛼𝑀 + 𝑡−𝛼𝑀 
 = 
𝑡𝛼𝑀+ 𝛼𝑀 2>0
 𝑡 𝑡−𝛼𝑀 + 𝑡−𝛼𝑀 
> 0  (A33) 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Define xindif  as the location of the consumer indifferent between buying the product from Firm 
A and buying from Firm B. Then, when both firms offer the service in equilibrium we have: 






).       (A34) 
When only Firm i sells the service, in equilibrium we have 
  xindif =
3𝑡−𝑐−𝑀𝛼+𝛾si
6𝑡−3𝑀𝛼
.        (A35) 
Consumer surplus when Firm A sells the service and Firm B does not is given by:  
𝐶𝑆𝐴 = 𝑀  𝑉 − 𝑡𝑥 − 𝑝𝑆𝑁
𝐴 + 𝛾 sA + 𝛼𝑀xindif  ⅆ𝑥
xindif
𝑥=0





𝑀  𝑉 − 𝑡𝑥 −  
3𝑡 + 2𝑐 − 𝛼𝑀 + 𝛾𝑠𝐴
3




 𝑀  𝑉 − 𝑡 1 − 𝑥 −  










𝑀 𝛼𝑀+2𝛾𝑠𝐴−2𝑐  2𝛾𝑠𝐴 𝑡−2𝑐𝑡+𝛼𝑀 7𝑡−3𝛼𝑀  
36 2𝑡−𝛼𝑀 2
 . (A36) 
Similarly, consumer surplus when only Firm B sells the service is given by: 




𝑀 𝛼𝑀+2𝛾𝑠𝐵−2𝑐  2𝛾𝑠𝐵𝐴 𝑡−2𝑐𝑡+𝛼𝑀 7𝑡−3𝛼𝑀  
36 2𝑡−𝛼𝑀 2
  (A37) 
Consumer surplus when both firms offer the service is given by 
 𝐶𝑆𝑠𝑠 = 𝑀  𝑉 − 𝑡𝑥 −  𝑐 + 𝑡 − 𝑁𝛼 +
1
3
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 𝑀  𝑉 − 𝑡 1 − 𝑥 −  𝑐 + 𝑡 − 𝑁𝛼 +
1
3







 6𝛼 𝑀 + 2𝛾 𝑠𝐴 + 𝑠𝐵 − 4𝑐 − 5𝑡 +
2𝑀𝑡 𝑠𝐴−𝑠𝐵  
2
36 𝑡−𝛼𝑀 2
.    (A38) 
Finally, consumer surplus when neither firm offers the service is given by: 
𝐶𝑆𝑁𝑁 = 𝑀  𝑉 − 𝑡𝑥 − 𝑡 ⅆ𝑥
0.5
𝑥=0
+  𝑀  𝑉 − 𝑡 1 − 𝑥 − 𝑡 ⅆ𝑥
1
0.5
= 𝑀𝑉 − 0.25𝑀𝑡 (A39) 
We denote the social welfare when both firms offer service, 𝜋𝑆𝑆
𝐴 + 𝜋𝑆𝑆
𝐵 + 𝐶𝑆𝑠𝑠 , by 𝑆𝑊𝑆𝑆 , 
the social welfare when neither firm offers service by, 𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝐴 + 𝜋𝑁𝑁
𝐵 + 𝐶𝑆𝑁𝑁, by 𝑆𝑊𝑁𝑁 , and the 
social welfare when only Firm i offers service by 𝑆𝑊𝑖  . The profit expressions are given in Table 
4, and were derived in Appendix 1. 
It is easy to show that  𝑆𝑊𝑆𝑆 > 𝑆𝑊𝑁𝑁  if and only if   










   (A40) 
Note that above is always satisfied if c <
 𝛼𝑀
 2
, and is satisfied for large enough values of sA and sB 
otherwise. In addition, 𝑆𝑊𝑖 > 𝑆𝑊𝑗  if and only is Si>Sj. 
𝐹𝑖 𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗   is defined as the difference between social welfare when both firms offer 
service to social welfare when only Firm i offers service, specifically:  
   𝐹𝑖 𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗  = 𝑆𝑊𝑠𝑠 -𝑆𝑊𝑖 . i=A, or B    (A41) 
Thus, when 𝐹𝑖 𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗  < 0, social welfare when only Firm i offers the service exceeds social 
welfare when both firms offer the service.  




Similarly, 𝑺𝑾𝑩 > 𝑺𝑾𝑵𝑵 iff 𝐬𝐁 >
𝟐𝒄−𝑴𝜶
𝟐𝜸
.   In addition it is easy to show that 
𝟐𝒄−𝑴𝜶
𝟐𝜸
< 𝐬. Thus, as 
long as 𝒔𝑨 >
𝟐𝒄−𝑴𝜶
𝟐𝜸
  or  𝒔𝑩 >
𝟐𝒄−𝑴𝜶
𝟐𝜸
  (or both), social welfare when one firm offers service 
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exceeds social welfare when neither offers it, and social welfare is maximized when both offer 
service if and only if  𝑭𝑨 𝒔𝑨, 𝒔𝑩 >0 and 𝑭
𝑩 𝒔𝑩, 𝒔𝑨 > 0. 
Finally, when 𝑠𝐴 <
2𝑐−𝑁𝛼
2𝛾
  and   𝑠𝐵 <
𝟐𝒄−𝑵𝜶
𝟐𝜸
, social welfare when neither firm offers service 




  and   𝒔𝑩 <
𝟐𝒄−𝑴𝜶
𝟐𝜸
, and c> 
 𝛼𝑀
 2
   we find that   𝑆𝑊𝑆𝑆 < 𝑆𝑊𝑁𝑁  , because condition A40 
is not satisfied (notice that the RHS of condition A40 evaluated at 𝑠𝐴 =
2𝑐−𝑀𝛼
2𝛾





Notice that when 𝑠𝐴 <
2𝑐−𝑁𝛼
2𝛾
  and   𝑠𝐵 <
𝟐𝒄−𝑵𝜶
𝟐𝜸
 in equilibrium neither firm offers service (as 
𝟐𝒄−𝑵𝜶
𝟐𝜸
< 𝐬. ).   
The rest is trivial based on the results from Proposition 1.  
Proof of Proposition 4 
(i)  We examine the derivate of the profit of Firm A, when both firms offer the service, with 















𝛾2 𝑠𝐴−𝑠𝐵  
2
 𝑡−𝛼𝑀 2
− 9      (A42) 















) . Under our assumption that both firms have positive demand, it must 









𝛾2 𝑠𝐴−𝑠𝐵  
2
 𝑡−𝛼𝑀 2
− 9 < 0  .     (A43) 




𝐵   is negative when both firms have positive product demand. 
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(ii)  Suppose that in equilibrium Firm A offers the service and Firm B does not. Then the 












𝑀2 −𝑡+𝛼𝑀−𝑐+𝛾𝑠𝐴   3𝑡−𝛼𝑀−𝑐+𝛾𝑠𝐴  
9 2𝑡−𝛼𝑀 2
    (A44) 
 = 𝐷𝑆𝑁
𝐴  
𝑀 −𝑡+𝛼𝑀−𝑐+𝛾𝑠𝐴  
3 2𝑡−𝛼𝑀 
         
Given our assumption that both firms have positive product demand, which also requires t >αM 




𝐴  is positive if and only if  
𝑀 −𝑡+𝛼𝑀−𝑐+𝛾𝑠𝐴  
3 2𝑡−𝛼𝑀 




It should be noted that 
𝑡−𝛼𝑀+𝑐
𝛾
 > 𝑠 if and only if 7t >8Mα . 












𝑀2 −5𝑡+2𝛼𝑀+𝑐−𝛾𝑠𝐴   3𝑡+𝑐−2𝛼𝑀−𝛾𝑠𝐴  
9 2𝑡−𝛼𝑀 2
   (A45) 
 = 𝐷𝑆𝑁
𝐵  
𝑀 −5𝑡+2𝛼𝑀+𝑐−𝛾𝑠𝐴  
3 2𝑡−𝛼𝑀 
  




𝐵  is negative if and only if 
𝑀 −5𝑡+2𝛼𝑀+𝑐−𝛾𝑠𝐴  
3 2𝑡−𝛼𝑀 
< 0. Given that 2t>αM 
(this conditions is required for an equilibrium in which only one firm sells service and both firms 





















. We conclude that when Firm A offers the service in equilibrium (which 
implies 𝑠𝐴 > 𝑠 ), it must be that 𝑠𝐴 >
−5𝑡+2𝛼𝑀+𝑐
𝛾




𝐵 < 0. 
 
- 47 - 
Proof of Proposition 5 














 9 𝑡 − 2𝛼𝑀 + 6𝛾 𝑠𝑖 − 𝑠𝑗  +









𝛾 𝑠𝑖−𝑠𝑗  
𝑡−𝛼𝑀








𝛾 𝑠𝑖−𝑠𝑗  
𝑡−𝛼𝑀
+ 3 − 2𝛼 is positive, which is equivalent to 
 𝑠𝑖 − 𝑠𝑗 >
3 2𝛼𝑀−𝑡  𝑡−𝛼𝑀 
𝛾𝑡
        (A47) 
The RHS of A47 can be either negative or positive. 




















2 𝛼2𝑀2−𝑡 𝑐−3𝑡+3𝛼𝑀−𝑠𝐴   
3𝑀 2𝑡−𝛼𝑀 




𝐴  is positive if and only if  
2 𝛼2𝑀2−𝑡 𝑐−3𝑡+3𝛼𝑀−𝛾𝑠𝐴   
3𝑀 2𝑡−𝛼𝑀 
 is positive, which, given the 




   
Proof of Proposition 6 
In proving Proposition 6 and 7, we make the following parameters assumptions: 




 (i = A and B) 
iii) 𝑐 < 3𝑡 − 𝛼𝑀  and  𝑐 > −3𝑡 + 2𝑀𝛼 +
𝑀𝛾2
3𝑐𝐴
 (but the latter is always satisfied given ii) 
Above conditions are necessary to guarantee that both firms have positive product demand under both the 
- 48 - 
SS and the SN/NS market configurations. 
We define Ri and Q as follows: 
 𝑅𝑖 = 9𝑐𝑖 𝑡 − 𝛼𝑀 − 𝛾
2𝑀 > 0 (i = A and B)      (A49) 
 𝑄 = 18𝑐𝐴𝑐𝐵 𝑡 − 𝛼𝑀 − 𝛾
2𝑀 𝑐𝐴 + 𝑐𝐵        (A50) 
 = 𝑐𝐴 9𝑐𝐵 𝑡 − 𝛼𝑀 − 𝛾
2𝑀 + 𝑐𝐵 9𝑐𝐴 𝑡 − 𝛼𝑀 − 𝛾
2𝑀 = 𝑐𝐴𝑅𝐵 + 𝑐𝐵𝑅𝐴 > 0  
The inequalities hold due to the above parameters assumptions. 
Next we examine how the service quality and profit of Firm A change with the degree of network effects 







𝛾𝑀 9𝑐𝐵  𝑡−𝛼𝑀 −𝛾
2𝑀 
54𝑐𝐴 𝑐𝐵  𝑡−𝛼𝑀 −3𝛾
2𝑀 𝑐𝐴+𝑐𝐵  
=
3𝛾3𝑀3𝑐𝐵  𝑐𝐵−𝑐𝐴  
𝑄2








𝑐𝐴𝑀 18𝑐𝐴  𝑡−𝛼𝑀 −𝛾
2𝑀  9𝑐𝐵  𝑡−𝛼𝑀 −𝛾
2𝑀 
2
9 18𝑐𝐴 𝑐𝐵  𝑡−𝛼𝑀 −𝛾
2𝑀 𝑐𝐴+𝑐𝐵   
2    











   




𝐴  is equal to that of the following expression: 
 𝑍 = −  18𝑐𝐵 𝑡 − 𝛼𝑀 + 𝛾
2𝑀 𝑅𝐵 + 2𝛾
4𝑀2 𝑐𝐴
2 + 27𝛾2𝑐𝐴𝑐𝐵
2𝑀 𝑡 − 𝛼𝑀 − 𝛾4𝑐𝐵
2𝑀2 
Note that the coefficient of 𝑐𝐴
2 is negative. Thus, Z is a concave function of cA. 
It can be show that Z is positive if and only if  
2𝛾2𝑐𝐵𝑀
27𝑐𝐵 𝑡−𝛼𝑀 + 81𝑐𝐵




27𝑐𝐵 𝑡−𝛼𝑀 − 81𝑐𝐵
2 𝑡−𝛼𝑀 2+36𝛾2𝑐𝐵𝑀 𝑡−𝛼𝑀 −4𝛾4𝑀
2
  






> 0. And when 𝑐𝐴 = 𝑐𝐵, 𝑍 = −2𝑐𝐵
2𝑅𝐵
2 < 0. 





27𝑐𝐵 𝑡−𝛼𝑀 − 81𝑐𝐵
2 𝑡−𝛼𝑀 2+36𝛾2𝑐𝐵𝑀 𝑡−𝛼𝑀 −4𝛾2𝑀
2
  and negative if  
2𝛾2𝑐𝐵𝑀
27𝑐𝐵 𝑡−𝛼𝑀 − 81𝑐𝐵
2 𝑡−𝛼𝑀 2+36𝛾2𝑐𝐵𝑀 𝑡−𝛼𝑀 −4𝛾2𝑀
2
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Proof of Proposition 7 
In Case SS, if 𝑐𝐴 = 𝑑𝐴𝑘 and 𝑐𝐵 = 𝑑𝐵𝑘. 
 𝑅𝑖 = 9𝑑𝑖𝑘 𝑡 − 𝛼𝑀 − 𝛾
2𝑀 > 0 (i = A and B) 
 𝑄 = 18𝑑𝐴𝑑𝐵𝑘







2 𝑡−𝛼𝑀 2 −𝑑𝐴 162𝑑𝐵
2 𝑘2 𝑡−𝛼𝑀 2−45𝛾2𝑑𝐵𝑘𝑀 𝑡−𝛼𝑀 −𝛾
2𝑀2 + 𝛾2𝑑𝐵𝑀 9𝑑𝐵𝑘 𝑡−𝛼𝑀 +𝛾
2𝑀   
9𝑄2
  
This is positive if and only if the numerator 𝑑𝐴
2 324𝑑𝐵𝑘
2 𝑡 − 𝛼𝑀 2 − 𝑑𝐴 162𝑑𝐵
2𝑘2 𝑡 − 𝛼𝑀 2 −
45𝛾2𝑑𝐵𝑘𝑀 𝑡 − 𝛼𝑀 − 𝛾
2𝑀2 +  𝛾2𝑑𝐵𝑀 9𝑑𝐵𝑘 𝑡 − 𝛼𝑀 + 𝛾














𝛾2𝑀   𝑘 9𝑑𝐴+18𝑑𝐵   𝑡−𝛼𝑀 +𝑅𝐴+2𝑅𝐵  𝑅𝐴+2𝛾
2𝑀 9𝑑𝐵𝑘 𝑡−𝛼𝑀 +𝑅𝐵    𝑑𝐵−𝑑𝐴  +2𝑑𝐴𝑅𝐴
2  
9𝑄2
> 0 as 𝑑𝐵 > 𝑑𝐴. 
 
 
 
 
